POWERS OF 5ALE IN AN EXECUTOR IN PENNSYLVANIA.1
Since the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court in Pennsylvania to authorize an executor to sell the real estate of his
testator is purely statutory, is limited to the cases specified, and
will not be exercised when the power conferred in the will is
sufficient, 2 it follows that it is often important to determine
whether the executor has power under the will to make-the sale
'in question. This question is frequently of extreme difficulty,
and the law in Pennsylvania On some of the points involved is in
a most unsatisfactory condition.
The particular point for discussion will be the question
whether the executor can confer a good title on the purchaser.
If there is no power, or if the power cannot be exercised or has
been improperly exercised, the executor's deed will confer no
title.3 Even in this case, it is apprehended, the purchaser will,
on equitable principles, be entitled to recover the purchase
money when he can do so without loss to the parties beneficially interested in the premises. The latter cannot have both
the land and the proceeds of the sale, and the executor who has
made an unauthorized sale should not be permitted to retain for
his own use the money he has received. 4 Although this principle
seems clear, it has been involved in some doubt by a recent decision,5 further reference to which is omitted through lack of
space.
y learned friend, Henry W. Hall, Esq., of the Philadelphia Bar, suggested the subject of this article as one suitable for discussion, and I am
indebted to him for a number of valuable suggestions, although he is not
responsible
for any of the views I have adopted.
2
Ex parte Huff, 2 Pa. 227 (1845),; Peterson's Est., 7 W. N. C, 507 (1879).
Sale made under order of Orphans' Court set aside because administrator
d. b. n. c. t. a. had power to sell under the will, Gideon's Est., 2 W. N. C. 355
(1876). See, also, Schwartz's Est., 168 Pa. 204 (1895). But see Marshall's
Est., 138 Pa. 26o (i8go), where the court confessedly made an advisory order.
'Downer v. Downer, 9 Watts, 6o (1839); Ross v. Barclay, 18 Pa. 179
(1851) ; Beeson v. Breading, 77 Pa. 156 (1874). The question as to the validity of the exercise of the power may be raised by the refusal of the purchaser
to pay the purchase money, as in the case of Styer v. Freas, 15 Pa. 339 (x85o).
'Confer, Fidler v. Lash, 125 Pa. 87 (I889); Jacoby v. McMahon, 174 Pa.
133 (I896), s. c., 189 Pa. i; Tyson's Est., 191 Pa. 218 (1899).
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Pa. 536 (iop).
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The power to sell is generally conferred in unmistakable
language and the words commonly used will clearly appear in
the various wills subsequently referred to. A few doubtful cases
are collected in the note.6
An executor is the person, or, in modern times, frequently
a corporation, named to carry out the directions of a man's last
will and testament. A testament relates solely to personal property, and a will to real estate, and the latter operates as a .devise
of the legal title and needs no executor. The office of an executor,
therefore, pertains properly to the administration of the personal
estate, and the executor has no authority over the real estate, except under a special provision to that effect contained in the will,
or by virtue of an Act of Assembly. 7 The power of the executor
over the land, therefore, when conferred by will, is regarded as
a pure common law warrant in the nature of a power df attorney,
and is to be strictly construed. This principle underlies the law
governing the operation and effect of the power of sale in an
executor. The independent operation of the provisions of the
will relating to real estate is well illustrated by the principle which
formerly obtained, that an executor who had been given power to
sell could sell, even though he had renounced and an administrator c. t. a. had been appointed.8
All real estate not disposed of by the will descends to the
heirs, and many difficult questions of construction formerly arose
in deciding whether the title was devised by the will to the execu"it these cases the words used were held insufficient to confer a power
of sale: Clark v. Riddle, 1i S. & R. 311 (1824) ; Sturgeon v. Ely, 6 Pa. 406
In these cases the words used
(1847) ; Herb v. Walther, 6 D. R. 687 (897).
were held sufficient to create a power of sale: Ex parte Elliott, 5 Whart. 524
(1840), senible; Morgan's Est., 27 W. N. C. 215 (189O), s. c. 9 Pa. C. C. 119,
20 Phila. 6o, 47 L. I 466. See Roland v. Miller, ioo Pa. 47 (1882); Arrott's
"I order my hereinafter named executor to
Est., 9 Pa. C. C. 535 (189)
convert my effects, excepting as excepted, into money as soon as can reasonably be done and make distribution as designated," Schropp v. Schaeffer, 2
D. R. 362 (1892).
"The subject of powers of sale in an executor under the provisions of
Acts of Assembly lies outside the scope of this discussion.
'For case of such a sale held valid, see Moody v. Fulmer, 3 Grant, 17
(1814).

As pointed out by Tilghman, C. J., at p. 30, the difficulty will no

longer arise, the power of sale being vested in the administrator c. t. a by the
Act of Assembly hereinafter referred to; see n. 9, post. See also, Miller
v. Meetch, 8 Pa. 417 (1848).
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tor or whether he had merely a naked power to sell land, the
title to which was in the heir or devisee. So also it was frequently important to determine whether the power of sale was a
power incident to the office of executor, a power virtute officii,
or whether it was a collateral trust.
With the exceptions hereinafter referred to, these questions
are no longer material in Pennsylvania, owing to several statutes
which have been passed. 9 The legislation, and the practical inconveniences it was designated to remedy, can best be discussed
under the several cases in which the questions of construction we
have just referred to were, formerly material. These are as
follows:
(i) Where there is a power of sale, but it is not specifically
conferred on the executor; this is a case of failure of the testator
to properly confer the power. (2) Where there are two or
more executors and one or more die, the case of surviving executor. (3) Where there are two or more executors, and one or
more renounce; the case of remaining executor. (4) Where the
executor or executors are all dead, or have all renounced, and an
administrator c. t. a. has been appointed.
The first of the cases to which we have referred is that
where there is a power of sale contained in the will, but the executor is not specifically designated as the person to execute the
power. In this case it was often a doubtful question whether the
power should devolve upon the heir-at-law as trustee or upon
the executor.' 0 The general rule was, that where the power was
incidental to the office of executor, it was to be exercised by the
executor, but in other cases it was to be exercised by the heir or
devisee."
Under -the legislation we have referred to,1 2 the
'Act March 12, i8oo, Secs. i, 2, 3, 4; 3 Sm. Laws, 433; Act February 24,
1834, Secs. 12, I4, 43, P. L. 70; Act April 22, 1856, Sec. 8, P. L. 532.
"0See remarks of Rogers, J., in Boshart v. Evans, 5 Whart. .551, at 561
(i84o); I Sugden on Powers, p. 134, et seq.
'In
these early cases, where no one was named to execute the power of
sale, a sale by an executor was proper and passed a good title, Lloyd's Lessee

v. Taylor,

2

Dallas, 223 (1795), s. c. i Yeates, 422.

Direction to sell after

death of widow and divide proceeds among children, Jenkins Lessee v.
Stouffer, 3 Yeates, 162 (i8oi). Sale by surviving executors; power similar
to above, Silverthorn v. McKinster, 12 Pa. 67, 1849.
'Note 9, ante.
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executor in such case may execute the power under the authority
of the Orphans' Court. 13 If an executor assumes to execute
such a power without the authority of the Orphans' Court, the
power, as it is said, is not divested and no title is conferred, 14
and the contract cannot be specifically enforced in the Common
Pleas.' 5 It is now, therefore, a question of construction whether
the power is specifically conferred.' 6 Where, however, a sale
has been made and deed delivered, the executor may report the
transaction to the court, and a confirmation, after notice to all
parties, will cure the defect,1 7 and in this case it seems that the
executor may now sell under the Price Act.'
Under the old law there were cases where a surviving
or remaining executor could execute the power of sale. 19 The
question whether the power could be exercised by a surviving
executor depended very largely upon whether the power was a
power vested in the executors by virtue of their office or whether
20
it was a collateral power. Under the legislation referred to
the necessity of drawing any distinction in these cases is obviated,

"The Act of February 24, 1834, Sec. 12, P. L. 70, merely regulates the
mode, is consistent with the Act of March 12, i8oo, Sec. I, 3 Sm. Laws, and
is not repealed by the Act of April 22, 1856, Sec. 8, P. L. 532.
"Bell's

App., 66 Pa. 498 (187o).

" Mussleman's App., 65 Pa. 480 (187o).
'" In these cases, arising since the passage of the act, the court held that
the power was not specifically conferred, and therefore a sale under the
authority of the Orphans' Court was proper, Woods' Est., i Pa. 368 (1845) ;
semble; McFarland's App., 37 Pa. 300 (i86o) ; Myers's App., 62 Pa. lO4 (I869).
Upon petition by legatee, the court ordered the executor to sell under the
act, saying the case was doubtful, but that the jurisdiction was wholesome
and ought not to be restrained by circumstances of mere implication, Houck
v. Houck, 5 Pa. 273 (1847). The executor may maintain ejectment without
the order of the Orphans' Court. ijrk v. Carr, 54 Pa. 285 (1867). In this
case, the power was specifically conferred and. it was not necessary to obtain
the approval of the Orphans' Court, Gray v. Henderson, 71 Pa. 368 (1872).
"Bell's App., 71 Pa. 465 (x872).
"For such a case, see Freker v. Berg, 193 Pa. 442 (1899). The reference
of McCollum, J., in the opinion in this case, to the Act of 1834, and the cases
of Myers' App., 62 Pa. lO4 (1869), and Bell's App., 71 Pa. 465 (1872), are
somewhat obscure.
"Remarks of the court in Livingood v. Heffner, 21 W. N. C. 148 (1888).
For a case of a sale by a surviving executor under will dated 1775, see Lessee
of Zebach v. Smith, 3 Binney, 69 (i8io).
"Note 9, ante.
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and the surviving executor 2' or remaining exectitor22 may exercise the power of sale.
The renunciation, however, must be by a writing filed of
record, and where the deed is made by less than the whole number, no renunciation by the others having been filed of record,
the deed will vest no title under the power, and the defective
execution cannot be cured by a subsequent renunciation even
23
though duly filed.
In the cases which we have just discussed, 24 there is now
no occasion to draw any distinction between the power of sale
vested in the executor by virtue of his office and collateral powers
25
of sale in trust. The object of the legislation on the subject
was to do away with this distinction. In the case, however, to
which we shall now direct our attention, that where the office of
executor is vacant by death or resignation, and an administrator
c. t. a. has been appointed, the Supreme Court has said that where
the power of sale is virtute officii, it devolves on the administrator c. t. a., but that when it is collateral, it is to be exercised by a
substituted trustee. This question of the nature of the power is
of considerable difficulty, and the cases will now be considered in
chronological order.
The first case appears to be Meredith's Estate,28 where there
was a general power of sale given to the executors,2 7 without any
purpose disclosed. A petition was presented by some of the
devisees for a decree directing the administrator c. t. a. who had
been appointed, to sell and distribute the proceeds according to
I Accordingly, in these cases the surviving executor properly executed the
power: Miller v. Meetch, 8 Pa. 417 (1848). In O'Rourke v. Sherwin, 156
Pa. 285 (1893), the three executors were also devisees of life estates in the
land, and the survivor of the three, it was held, could make a good title
under the power.
' Sale by remaining executor valid, McDowell v. Gray, 29 Pa. 21 (857).
See Miller v. Meetch, 8 Pa. 417 (1848), forla discussion of what amounts to
a renunciation.
'Herron v. Heffner, 3 Rawle, 393 (1834), Act of 18oo; Neal v. Beach,
92 Pa. 221 (1879).
" (I) Where power of sale is not specifically conferred; (2) case of surviving or remaining executor.
"See note 9, ante.
Parson's Eq., 433 (185o).
"i
"Sharswood, J., in Evans v. Chew, 71 Pa. 47, at 57 (i872), said that
this was a power of sale for the payment of debts.
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law and the terms of the will, and a decree was made accordingly, the court deciding that the power was one proper to be
28
exercised by the administrator c. t. a.
In Ross v. Barclay, 9 a testator, domiciled in New York,
gave and devised the residue of his estate unto his executors
therein named, in trust, to accumulate the income until the death
of his wife, and then to be distributed, with general power of
sale contained in a subsequent clause. The will was proved in the
City of New York, and the two executors who took out letters
there renounced, and letters of administration c. t. a. were issued
to an individual in Pennsylvania. It was held, that the administrator could not execute the power of sale; that the renunciation
of the executorship and trust, so far as the lands in Pennsylvania
were concerned, was void. Gibson, C. J., 3 0 said, "The transfer
of real property is *governed by the lex loci rei sitae; and no
statute of Pennsylvania empowers an administrator, with the
will annexed, to execute a trust of land confided to an executor'
by title or by name, for any other purpose than to sell for payment of debts. By force of the Act of the 24th of February,
1834, relating to executors and administrators, he may execute
a power to sell in order to bring the land into a course of administration, but not to execute a trust for a collateral purpose; for
instance, to manage the property and invest the proceeds for
accumulation; or to maintain the widow and children; or to
turn the land into money for the convenience of partition; or to
exercise any discretionary power confided to his predecessor in
the administration for his personal fitness and fidelity." In
Shalter's Appeal, 8' 1 where the testator directed the residue of
his estate to be sold at public sale as soon after his decease as may
be, so that it be done within one year, the sale was made in 184o,
King, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, pointed out that the
provisions of the Act of i8oo, giving the power to the administrator c. t. a.,
were omitted from the Act of 1834, and only conferred inferentially by the
43rd section of that act and the declaratory provisions of the Act of April
22, 1856, Sec. 8, P. L. 532. It seems clear, however, in view of the later cases,
where an administrator c. t. a. has been held competent to execute a power
of sale, that the doubt suggested by the learned judge no longer exists and

may, therefore, be dismissed without further comment.
29 iS Pa. 179 (i85i).
"At p. 183.

"43 Pa. 83 (z862).
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the testator having died in 1836. The court held that the power
was properly exercised by the administrator c. t.a. It did not
appear why the sale was made or what disposition the administrator c. t.a. made of the proceeds of the sale. The circumstance
that the sale was directed so soon after the decease of the testator
seems to indicate that it was necessary for the purpose of settling
the estate. The case arose on a proceeding by the widow to charge
the purchaser from the administrator c. t.a. with the amount of
her interest under the will, and the court entered a decree directing the administrator c. t.a. to pay the amount due her. The
sale was perhaps for the purpose of distribution, and there is
very little discussion of the point in the opinion in the case. In
Keefer v. Schwartz,3 2 the direction was as follows: "I direct
my executors to sell my house and lot after my death to the best
advantage as soon as may be," with a probable, although not
clearly stated in the report, disposition of the proceeds. The
court said, in an opinion by Strong, J., "The executors were not
made testamentary trustees of the property. They were directed
to sell for distribution. Their duties and powers were official,
by virtue of their office. When they renounced, their duties and
powers devolved upon the administrator with the will annexed,
by virtue of the 3d section of the Act of March 12th, i8oo, continued in force by the Act of 2oth February, 1834 . See Meredith's Estate, i Parsons, 433." This case completely disregards
the dictum by Gibson, C. J., in Ross v. Barclay, 33 that a power
of sale for the purposes of distribution does not pertain to the
office of executor. In Waters v. Margerum, 84 the executors were
apparently authorized3 5 to sell for the purpose of investing the
proceeds in trust for certain designated purposes. The court
held that the power was not properly executed by the administrator c. t. a., Sharswood, J., saying, 36 "The deed by George K.
Waters, administrator de bonis non, with the will annexed of
George Knoppenberger, unquestionably conveyed no title to the
247

Pa. 503 (1864).

=i8 Pa. 179 (1851).
"6o Pa. 39 (1869).
"See p. 42 of the report.
"At p. 44.
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plaintiff. The power to sell given by the will to the executors
was not for the payment of debts, but for the distribution among
legatees and for investment. Ross v. Barclay, 6 Harris, 183,
decides that such an administrator, under the 6 7 th section of
the Act of February 24th, 1834, Pamph. L. 86, may execute a
power to sell in order to bring the land into a course of administration, but not to carry out a trust for a collateral purpose,
such, for instance, as here, to turn it into money for convenience
of partition."
In Evans v. Chew,87 the testator died in 1835. The sale
was made under the power in I87O, the debts having been paid,
for the purpose of distributing the proceeds in accordance with
the directions of the will, and it was held that the power was
properly exercised by the administrator c. t. a. Sharswood, J.,3 1
repudiated the dictum of Gibson, C. J., in Ross v. Barclay,3 9 and
his own remarks in accordance therewith in the case of Waters v.
Margerum, 40 that a power of sale for distribution did not pertain
to the office of executor. This case put the law on a clear footing, that a power of sale for purposes of distribution pertains to
the office of executor and devolves on the administrator c. t. a.
The same principle has been affirmed in a number of later cases ;41
although Ross v. Barclay 42 was followed at that time in a lower
court case.48
It was furthermore decided that a power to sell in the
71 Pa. 47 (1872).
IsAt p. 51.
18 Pa. i79 (x85I).
46o Pa. 39 (869).
'In Gideon's Est., 2 W. N. C. 355 (1876), the words of the will were, "I
authorize my executors (paming them), for the better division of my estate,
to sell and dispose of my real estate on the decease of my wife, or in case
of her marriage, then on the arrival of my youngest child at age, and to
grant and convey the same to the purchaser or purchasers thereof." The
testator died in 18ig; the widow died in 1869, and a sale after widow's death
by the administrator c. t. a. was valid. In Jackman v. Delafield, 6 W. N. C.
9 (1877), there was a gift of the residue, consisting of real estate, to the
executor, with authority to sell and dispose of the proceeds among the testator's children and it was held that the power was properly exercised by the
administrator c. t. a. See also Wetherill v. Commonwealth, 17 W. N. C. 104
(1885) ; Lantz v. Boyer, 81 Pa. 325 (1876) ; Potts v. Breneman, 182 Pa. 295
(1897) ; Tarrance v. Reuther, 185 Pa. 279 (1898) ; Pugh's Est., 17 Phila. 5o9
(1885), L. I., Vol. 42, p. 454.
'.H
Hepburn's Est., 8 Phila. 2o6 (1871), L. I. of 1871, p. 212.
42 18 Pa. 179 (185x).
37
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executor devolved on the administrator c. t. a., notwithstanding
the circumstance that there was a direction to invest the proceeds
of a sale made during the life of a life tenant.44 It made no
difference if the entire estate was given in trust. The devolution
of the power depended on the objects for which it was to be
exercised. Thus, in Dorff's Appeal, 45 there was a gift of the
entire estate, in trust, for testator's wife for life, then to divide
the same among his children, with directions that the share of
some of them should be held in trust, with power in the executors
to sell, in their discretion. The court said, "However, we are
clearly of the opinion that the power in the will of James Hunt
(the decendent) was vested in his executors virtute oficii. It
was to make distribution, and the fact that the portion of the
daughters was to be set aside and held in trust for them, did not
change the character of the power. After the sale, had each
share separately been directed to be invested in trust, it would
still have been a power for distribution and exercised by the
executors virtute officii. Of course, under the law, as well settled, it survived to the administrator cunt testamento annexo."
The law up to this point, therefore, was fairly well settld, and
an opinion could be ventured with some confidence as to a title
derived under a power exercised by an administrator c. t. a. The
Supreme Court, however, in the most unfortunate decision of
into confusion and reverted
Gehr v. McDowell, 46 threw the law
47
to the position of Ross v. Barclay.
In Gehr v. McDowell the provisions of the will were as
follows: "Upon the arrival at the age of twenty-one years of
the youngest child of my said son, Elijah, or upon the decease
of my said son, Elijah, if he should die without issue, I order
and direct my executor to sell all my real estate, subject however
to charge of the one-third or dower interest of my wife, Mary,
therein, if she should then be living, and pay over to the child
or children of my said son, Elijah, and the lawful issue of any
'4 Wurfflein v. Haines, 14 W. N. C. 76 (1883); see 15 W. N. C. 28 (1884);
Livingood v. Heffner, 21 W. N. C. x48 (1888).
40 i
W. N. C. 335 (I881).
2o6 Pa. ioo (i9o3).
ii8 Pa. 179 (I85I).
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of them who may then be deceased, having left such issue, theproceeds of such sale." The court below, in an opinion by
Stewart, P. J., affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court without
an opinion, held that the power did not pertain to the executor
by virtue of his office, and was to be exercised by a substituted
4S
trustee, quoting the dictum of Gibson, C. J., in Ross v. Barclay,
without noticing the repudiation of that doctrine by Sharswood,
., in Evans v. Chew, 4 9 and the intervening cases we have cited,
deciding that a power for distribution was a power virtute officii.
In view of this case, it is impossible to state what the law really
is. The safer practice now is to have a substituted trustee and
an administrator c. t. a. appointed. Each one can then exercise the power, and the purchaser's title will thus be good, no
matter what view the Supreme Court may take of the question
in the future.
It is suggested, however, that the real distinction, which it
must be confessed is not supported by the cases, is this: a power
of sale is vested in an executor as an executor when the exercise
of the power results in the executor handing over the proceeds
of the sale to the persons designated in the will as owners thereof.
Its exercise, therefore, necessitates an accounting of the proceeds
of the sale because of the sale. A power of sale is vested in a
trustee as trustee when the exercise of the power simply operates
to dispose of the property without disturbing the equitable estate
which has been superimposed thereon, and when the trustee or
party making the sale is not under any duty of accounting meiely
because of the sale, but must account for the proceeds of the
sale merely as part of his administration of the trust. To put it
shortly, in the case of an executor, the power of sale operates to
change the ownership, and the executor, on exercising the power
and accounting for the proceeds of the sale, has discharged his
duties. In the case of the trustee, the exercise of the power does
not change or divest the ownership, and the party exercising it
continues in his duties as to the proceeds on the same trusts as
were before imposed on the title which he sold.
Where there was a naked power to sell in the executor, sev4818
497

Pa. 179 (185).
Pa. 47 (1872).
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eral questions arose as to the survival of the power and exercise
thereof, and it was often a difficult question of construction to
decide whether there was a naked poqer or a devise to the executors to sell. 50
In Pennsylvania, this difficulty was obviated by the Act of
February 24, I834,'; which, in effect, provided that every executor having a naked authority, inter.alica, to- sell land conferred by
will, should have, for the purposes of the sale and conveyance, the
same interest as if the land had been devised to him to be sold.
Although this Act has produced great confusion in the minds of
the judges, so that the observations on it in the books are far from
uniform, it simply has, so far as the execution of the power
is concerned, the effect of enabling the executor, who has a naked
power of sale, to pass the title by the exercise of the power, even
though the title is vested in the devisee or heir, and we may therefore dismiss from this discussion any extended reference to the
distinction between the case of a naked power in the executor and
a devise to the executor to sell. Except that in the case where
the power is nugatory, or, having once been valid, has become,
for some reason, exhausted, void, or in such state that it cannot
be exercised, there is a slight distinction in the theory involved in
the disposition of the property directed to be sold. If there is a
devise of' the legal title or an intestacy with the naked power, the
naked power, becoming void, drops and the title remains exactly
where it was- before. Where, however, there is a devise with
power to sell, and the power cannot for any reason be exercised,
the executor holds the legal title in trust, and as in such case
there is generally no disposition under the will, there is a resulting
trust to the heir-at-law. In this case it is undoubtedly better
practice for the heir to take a conveyance of the legal title from
the executor, and if there is any question as to whether the power
is still in existence, the executor should convey under the power
for a nominal consideration.
It sometimes happens that -a testator will fix a certain
period of time within which or after which a sale is to be made.
" Thus, where there was a naked power to sell under the old law, the
power could not be exercised by the administrator c. t. a., Moody v. Vandyke,
.
4 Binney, 31 (I81).

u Sec. 13, P. L. 70.
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When there is a direction to the executors to sell within a certain
period, they have a discretion to sell at any time within the
period, and a sale at any time after the period will pass a good
title,52 for the reason that there is a direction to sell which
entitles the donees of the proceeds to compel a sale, and they
cannot be deprived of the right because of the failure of the
executor to sell within the period.
But where there is merely a discretionary power to sell
within a certain period, there is no one, who has a right to compel
the sale, and the authority, therefore, ceases at the time fixed,
and a sale after the time will confer no title. 3
Where there is a gift of a life estate and a power of sale to
be exercised at the death of the life tenant, for whose benefit
the sale can be said to be postponed, the power may be exercised
4
before the decease of the life tenant with the latter's consent.5
A direction not to sell until after the expiration of a certain
"Direction to sell on or before the first day of April next and distribution
of the proceeds, a sale after the time was valid, Miller v. Meetch, 8 Pa. 417
(1848). There is an error in the third paragraph of the syllabus of this
case. The phrase "sell so much of the real estate as they think proper," should
be "sell either at public or private sale as they may judge proper." Consequently, an administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. is properly charged with the proceeds of a sale made by him after the period. Shalter's App., 43 Pa. 83
(1862) ; Fredericks v. Kerr, 229 Pa. 365 (i9o8). In Brisben's App., 7o Pa.
405 (872), there was a direction not to sell within two years except at a
certain price, and no question as to the validity of such direction was raised.
In Roland v. Miller, ioo Pa. 47 (1883), the testatrix directed that her
real estate should not be sold until ten years after her decease, but that if
her executors should lease the property for fifteen years, they should not be
compelled by her heirs to sell the same until the expiration of the lease, and
then in a subsequent clause further provided that if her executors should
think it advantageous, they might sell at any time within said ten or fifteen
years. Executors sold land after ten years, within fifteen years. The court
held the sale was valid and there was a dictum that the direction to sell was
discretionary in the executors during the fifteen years and absolutely after
that time. In Waddell's Est., 196 Pa. 294 (i9oo), where the clause was, "My
executors shall sell as soon as the same can conveniently be done," it was
held the executors had discretion as to the time of making the sale. So, also,
such a discretion cannot be controlled by less than all the legatees, as they
all must join to save the executors from the peril of. the non-exercise of their
own judgment. Compare, Marshall's Est., 238 Pa. 26o (i8go).
" In Herb v. Walther, 6 D. R. 687 (1897), the clause was, "I hereby desire
that my executors shall sell * * * within one year after my death," and
the court held that it was merely a discretionary power to sell and must be
exercised within a year.
"Gast v. Porter, 13 Pa. 533 (i85o). Life tenant was one of the executors
and signified her consent by joining in the deed as executor. Brown's App.,
27 Pa. 62 (i856), life tenant was the widow of the testator, and sufficiently
signified her consent to the sale by formally electing to take against the will.
Hamlin v. Thomas, 126 Pa. 2o (i889), s. c. 24 W. N. C. 4 (i889), consent
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period will give a power of sale after the expiration of the
period, by implication. 55 The question as to when, under the
terms of the will, the power is exercisable, is often a difficult
56
question of construction.
Where the sale is to be made after the happening of a certain event, the executor cannot sell before the happening of the
event,57 and where he attempts to do so, the court will enjoin the
exercise of the power.5
When the words of the will are such that the exercise of
the power may be compelled by the parties beneficially interested.
there is said to be a legal power. Why this term should be
applied does not clearly appear. The question whether the exercise of the power can be compelled depends on the whole scheme
of the will and the adjustment of the conflicting rights- of the
parties entitled to the proceeds of the sale, and the parties, if
any, interested in having the sale postponed. In no event does
the solution of this question affect the title which the executor
confers under the deed. It is not necessary, therefore, to make
any extended reference to the subject.59
Even where there is a power of sale in a will, the court
may control the executor in the exercise thereof and review,
of the life tenant may be shown by oral testimony. Statute of Frauds does
not apply. Styer v. Freas, 15 Pa. 339 (I85O), S. C.21 Pa. 86, 2 Grant's Cases,
453, life tenant joined in the deed. Coover's App., 74 Pa. 143 (1873), widow
was life tenant and elected to take against the will, and the executor, it was
held, could exercise the power immediately. These decisions probably overrule
the earlier case of Sweigert v. Fry, 8 S. & R. 299 (1822).
Inquest of partition before the expiration of the period was set aside,
Palmer's App., i Amer. Law Reg. 439 (1853).
"See Smith v. Folwell, i Binney, 546 (18o9).
"Hay v. Mayer, 8 Watts, 203 (1839), where the power of sale at the
death of the daughter was postponed by the intervention of an estate as tenant by the curtesy in her husband. The attempted sale before her death
was void, anyhow, as it was not a due execution of the power. In Loomis
v. McClintock, iO Watts, 274 (840), there was a devise of certain premises
to a daughter, Sarah, until such time as her daughter Catherine shall have
attained the age of twenty-one years; or, in case of Catherine's decease,
until such time as she would have been twenty-one years old if living, and then
to be sold by testatrix's executors and the proceeds divided, etc. The executors sold the property nine years before Catherine's twenty-first birthday, and
it was held the sale was void.
"McLane v. McLane, 207 Pa. 465 (19o4).
"In Severns's Est. (No. 2), 211 Pa. 68 (i9o5), the court compelled the
exercise of the power. In Peterson's Est., 7 W. N. C. 507 (1879), the court
declined to interfere, and in Bruner v. Naglee, 7 Phila. 384 (i87O), L. I.
1870, p. i96, the court declined to stop the executors from selling.
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set aside and, if necessary, order a re-sale of the property when
there are circumstances of fraud, abuse of trust or inadequacy
of price.6 0 It may be observed here that the sale cannot be set
aside unless the purchaser is a party to the proceeding.0 1
A question of construction frequently arises as to what portion of the testator's estate is subject to the power of sale vested
62
in the executor. A few of these cases are collected in the note.
When the executor has a power of sale to be exercised immediately on the death of a certain person, he is not thereby
authorized to grant an option on the property for a certain
period because the option may defeat the direction for an immediate sale, and operate to deprive the executor of his discretion in exercising the power conferred. 3
The question is frequently raised as to whether a power of
sald includes a power to mortgage. 6
In Wurfflein v. Haines,6 9 there was a power in the executor
"to bargain and sell, convey and absolutely dispose of all or any
portion of my real estate," etc., and a mortgage by the administrator c. t. a. was sustained.
In McCreary v. Bomberger, 70 there was a devise and bequest
to testator's wife, A, "to have and to hold for and during her
natural life, and at the death of my said wife, all the property,
* * * or so much thereof as may remain unexpended to be
in trust, * * * and further, if at any time it should be deemed
' For cases of exercise of such control, see

(Inadequacy of price)

Pollard v. McFillen, 6 Phila. 125, L. I., Vol. 23, p. 117 (1866).

(Collusion, in-

adequacy of price) Hauck's Est., 37 Pitts. L. J. 8 (1889) ; see also, Daily's
App., 87 Pa. 487 (1878). For cases where the sale was not set aside, see:
(Price adequate) Dietrich's Est., i Lehigh Val. L. R. 193 (1886). (No fraud)
Andrews' Est., 6 D. R. 24 (1897).
" Dundas's App., 64 Pa. 325 (1870), S.c. 27 L. I. 149, 2 Leg. Gaz. 145,
affirming 7 Phila. 518, 26 L. I. 412.
'Downer v. Downer, 9 Watts, 6o (1839) ; Beeson v. Breading, 77 Pa. 156
(1874) ; Swan v. Covert, 138 Pa. 3o6 (I8go) ; Penna. Co. for Ins. on Lives, &c.,
v. Leggate, 166 Pa. 147 (1895); Eisenbrown v. Burns, 3o Pa. Sup. Ct. 46
(i9o6).
" Consequently, a bill in equity by the holder of the option for specific
performance was dismissed, Hickok v. Still, 168 Pa. i55 (i895).
'"For a case of an express power to mortgage, and construction of what
mortgage was authorized thereby, see Miller v. Schlegel, 1o W. N. C. 521
(I88r).
" 14 W. N. C. 76 (i883), s. c. I5W. N. C. 28 (I884).
I 1iPa. 323 (1892), S.c. 31 W. N. C. 41, reversing ii Pa. C. C. 68.
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advantageous to dispose of (the premises), my said executrix
* * * is hereby authorized and empowered to sell and dispose
of the same, the proceeds to be re-invested in or secured by other
real estate subject to the same conditions." A was appointed
executrix of the will, and made a mortgage which was joined
in by the trustee for the remainderman, and it was held that the
71
power to sell was well executed.
It is now generally accepted as the law that a mortgage is
a valid execution of a power of sale vested in an executor,
although, perhaps, in view of the phraseology in the wills we
have referred to, it will be safer to confine this statement to the
case where the words are "sell and dispose of."
There is the further qualification that the mortgage must
be for the benefit of the estate. It is consequently necessary to
inquire what is to be done with the proceeds of the mortgage,
although, it is apprehended, the mortgagee is not under any liability to see to the application of the mortgage money. A number
of cases will therefore occur where, although the words of the
power are, under the decisions, apparently sufficient to justify
the execution of a mortgage, yet the other provisions in the will
preclude the conclusion that the testator intended to authorize
the giving of a mortgage. This is probably the case where an
absolute conversion is contemplated,7 2 and also in most cases of
a power of sale vested in a trustee. Here the power is for the
purpose of investment and re-investment, and enables the trustee
to procure a higher rate of income for the cestui que trust. A
mortgage is in such a case inconsistent with the notion of producing a revenue, and the execution of the mortgage will therefore
73
frequently be an improper exercise of the power.
The deed of the executor under the power should be drawn
and executed in his official capacity, refer to the power and purport on its face to be in execution thereof, for the rule of law
11It is to be remarked that the clause "so much as may remain unexpended" gave the life tenant rather extensive power over the property, independently of the express power to sell, and as the mortgage was made by
her in her individual capacity, it could well be referred to that clause in the
will and not to the power.
"Dictum, Sterrett, C. J., in Freeman's Est., I8i Pa. 405 (897), at 4IM.
" For a case of a mortgage held to be a valid execution of a power of
sale in a trustee, see Zane v. Kennedy, 73 Pa. 182 (1873).
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is that the executor must have, as it is said, an intention to execute the power, and that intention must appear in the transaction.
The formalities referred to clearly show that the intention to
execute was present. Where, however, the deed recites the
power, it has been decided that the circumstance that it is draNon
and executed by the executor as an individual is immaterial, and
the power, notwithstanding, is well executed, even if the executor has also an individual interest in the property. 74
So also if the executor has no individual interest in the
land which he can convey, a deed in 'his individual capacity
will be a good execution of the power, even though it contains
no reference thereto, for the reason that the deed cannot take
effect at all unless it takes effect as an execution of the power,
and since it cannot be presumed to be executed without an intention that it shall be valid, the intention to execute the power
75
is presumed.
Where, however, the executor has an interest in the premises
which can be conveyed and executes the deed in his individual
capacity without referring to the power, the deed will operate
on the interest and will not be an execution of tfie power, since
it can take effect either way, and the intention to execute the
78
power does not clearly appear.
In McCreary v. Bomberger, 77 the executrix made a mortgage in her individual capacity purporting to execute a power of
sale conferred upon her as executrix of the will. The executrix
had also a life estate in the property. The court held, in an
opinion by Paxson, C. J., that the circumstance that there was
no reference to the power in the mortgage was immaterial, as
there was abundance of evidence, from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, that there was an intention to execute
the power, and that these circumstances were the application of
the proceeds of the mortgage to the trust property, and the fact
that the trustee for the remainderman joined in the execution of
"' Miller v. Meetch, 8 Pa. 417 (1848) ; Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, io W. N. C.
65 (1881).
"Allison v. Kurtz, 2 Watts, 185 (1834); Jones v. Wood, 6 Pa. 25 (1851).
TVHay v. Mayer, 8 Watts, 203 (1839); Robeno v. Marlatt, 136 Pa. 35
(I89O), s. C. 26 W. N. C. 385, reversing 6 Pa. C. C. 251, 46 L. I. 36.
T15, Pa. 323 (1892), s. c. 31 W. N. C. 41, reversing ir Pa. C. C. 68.
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the mortgage, for if the executrix had intended to bind only her
life estate, the joinder of the trustee was wholly unnecessary.
It is submitted that this case tends to introduce an element
of uncertainty into the question of what is a due execution of the
power, in so far as it lays down the principle that the question
of the intent to execute can be inferred from circumstances other
than those clearly appearing upon the face of the title.
Where there is a power of sale in an executor, and he executes a deed purporting to be for a consideration, the deed is a
good execution of the power, and no evidence can be admitted to
show that no consideration actually passed. The averment in the
deed is conclusive as to its operation as a deed of bargain and
sale. 7 9 It is clear, however, that fraud or collusion between the
executor and the purchaser may be shown just as in any other
case of fraud.8 0 In the absence of fraud, the consideration cannot be inquired into in order to invalidate the title passed by the
exercise of the power, 81 and particularly is this true as against a
subsequent purchaser for value without notice.82 Of course,
even if the title passes to the purchaser, the donees of the proceeds
of the sale may hold the executor to account for neglect in obtaining or securing the consideration or in not securing a proper
price. 83 This question, of course, has no effect on the passing of
the title by the deed of the executor.
When the testator requires that the sale be made with the
consent of one or more persons, the validity of the exercise of
the power is conditioned on that consent, which must be personal
and cannot be given by any one else. It seems that the consent is revocable up to the time of the delivery of the deed
unless founded on a valuable consideration, 5 Consequently,
"Allison v. Kurtz, 2 Watts, 185 (1834). See, also, the case of a power
to sell a fee subject to an executory devise, Barnet v. Deturk, 43 Pa. 92 (1862).
"See Price v. Junkin, 4 Watts, 85 (835).
" Shippen v. Clapp, 29 Pa. 265 (1857); White v. Williamson, 2 Grant,
249

(1858).
' Cadbury v. Duval, 1o Pa. 265 (1849).

" See Shippen's Heirs v. Clapp, 29 Pa. 265 (1857) ; Mitchell's Est., I Leg.
Gaz. 74 (i869), s. c. i Pears. 428. This question, of course, has no effect on
the passing of the title by the deed of the executor.
"Accordingly, the assent was permitted to be withdrawn in Kling v.
Hummer, 2 P. & W. 349 (831).
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if the person designated dies, the power cannot be exercised; if
given to two or more, it does not survive, -and when one dies
without the consent having been given, it cannot ever thereafter
be exercised. s6 In Hackett v. Milnor, 7 there was a direction to
an executor to sell with the consent and approval of three daughters. One daughter died, and a sale approved by the other two
,was held to pass a good title. In this case, however, under the
limitations of the will, the two surviving daughters were practically the sole and absolute owners of the property, and, of
course, could not be deprived of their right to make a sale or
consent to a sale because of the death of their sister.
In most cases of a power of sale conferred upon an executor
there is such a direction to sell as will involve the application of
the doctrine of equitable conversion. As was well said, however,
by Clark, J:, in Livingood v. Heffner, s8 the question of whether
there is an equitable conversion is immaterial in determining
whether the executor can make a good title under the power.
There may be a valid power of sale which does not amount to
an equitable conversion, and it does not follow that because the
executor cannot be compelled to exercise the power of sale that
he cannot exercise it voluntarily.
Questions unconnected with the question of the validity of
the power of sale frequently arise between the purchaser and
the executor as to their rights and duties under the contract.8 9
Furthermore, any power of sale conferred upon an executor is
subordinate to the rights of any third parties in the land which
attach in the lifetime of the testator. The latter cannot by giving
a power of sale put his executors in a better position than he occupied himself. 90 So also the vendor under articles of agreement
may die pending the execution of the agreement, and a question
be raised as to the effect thereon of a power of sale conferred on
his executors. 9
" Kling v. Hummer,
Pa. 1 (1893).

2

P. & W. 349 (1831).

ST I56

IS21 W. N. C. 148, at 149 (1888).
"See Morgan's Est., 27 W. N. C. 215 (i89o), s.c. g Pa. C. C. 119,
Phila. 60, 47 L. I. 466; Cornell v. Green, io S. & R. 14 (1823).

20

" Sedam v. Shaffer, 5 W. & S. 529 (1843); Marvine v. Drexel, 68 Pa.
362 (1871).
"For such a case see Seitzinger v.Weaver, i Rawle, 377 (1829). From
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The question whether the sale under the power divests
the lien of debts and legacies, is simply another statement of
part of the question whether the purchaser is liable to see to the
application of the purchase money.9 2 Where there is a power of
sale for the payment of legacies, a sale under the power does not
divest the lien of the debts of the testator, even though the purchaser had no notice of the debt at the time of taking title, 93 for
the reason that the purchaser must or ought to know that the
debts are a lien on the land, and the testator cannot give his executors power of sale for the payment of legacies to the prejudice
of the creditors. In the case of a power of sale for the payment
of debts and legacies, a sale under the power discharges the lien
of the debts and the purchaser is not liable to see to the application of the purchase money, 94 for the reason that the purchaser
cannot see to such application without involving himself in an
account of the debts which must be paid first. It may also be
noted that a sale under a power for the payment of debts discharges the land from the dower of the testator's widow.95 So
also where there is a devise of the real estate to the executors in
trust to sell and apply the net proceeds first to the payment of
debts to which the land may be subject and not otherwise provided for, and to distribute the surplus money to testator's children, a sale under the power discharges the lien of the debts. 0
Where there is a direction to sell which amounts to an equitable
conversion, the land is turned into personal property at the death
this case it appears that the executors cannot assent to the introduction of a
new vendee, and a conveyance to such vendee will be void.
"For a statement of the English equity rule on the subject, see remarks
of Bell, J., in Cadbury v. Duval, io Pa. 265 (1849), at pp. 267, 268.
" Hannum v. Spear, i Yeates, 553 (1795).
"Grant v. Hook, 13 S.& R. 259 (1825). See this case for a discussion of
what amounts to a charge or schedule of debts in the will.
" Mitchell v. Mitchell, 8 Pa. 126 (1848).
" Cadbury v. Duval, 1o Pa. 265 (1849). The executors made a conveyance to the widow purporting to be for a consideration which, however, did
not pass, and she made a mortgage thereon for the purpose of raising money
to pay the debts, and failed to so apply the proceeds of the mortgage. This
mortgage was foreclosed, and a controversy arose between the creditor of
the testator and the mortgagee over the distribution of the fund raised by
the sale. The court said that the mortgagee was a purchaser for value without notice of the nominal character of the conveyance to the widow; that the
deed on its face was valid as to him, and the exercise of the power discharged
the lien of the debts. McCartney's Est., 18 Phila. 35 (1886). Acc.
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of the testator, the creditors have no lien on the land and can
come in on the fund raised by the sale whenever the land is
sold. 7 But where there is a general discretionary authority
to sell real estate not amounting to an equitable conversion, the
exercise of the power does not discharge the lien of the decedent's debts, even though the power expressly exempts the
purchaser from the liability of seeing to the application of the
purchase money.9s
The question, therefore, whether the exercise of the power
divests the lien of the debts and legacies, depends on the express
purpose of the power, and it is not always easy to determine
whether the power in question is sufficient to relieve the purchaser from the liability to see to the application of the purchase
money.
This question, however, has lost much practical importance
in so far as the lien of debts is concerned, because of the provisions of the Price Act, under which executors may have the
sale approved and the lien of debts discharged, even though there
is a power of sale conferred in the will.9 9 The purchaser may
also pay the money into court under the provisions of the Acts of
February 24, 1834,100 and May 17, 1866,101 and take title free

from any lien. It is undoubtedly of practical advantage to have
the sale ratified by the court and all 'questions removed rather
than have the title depend on a nice question of law as to whether
the exercise of the power will divest the lien of the debts and
legacies. This question, of course, will not arise after the statutory period for the lien of debts has passed.
The statement that a power is exhausted is often misapplied.
Properly speaking, it means that the power is used up, but it is
often applied where the power has never been, or never can be
used, for some reason or other, such as the lapse of the time
fixed for its exercise or because the event upon which it was to
1 02
be exercised can never happen.
"McWilliams' App., H7 Pa. i1 (1887); Mustin's Est., 194 Pa. 437
(19oo); 58 University of Pa. Law. Rev., p. 492.
" Seeds v. Burk, 181 Pa. 281 (1897).
"Wainwright's Est., II Phila., 147 (1876), S.C.33 L. I. 280.
1

' Sec. i9,P. L. 70.

...
Sec. 2, P. L. i096.

'See

Swift's App., 87 Pa.

502

(1878).
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Where the power has once been exercised, it has been exhausted and never can be exercised again. 10 3 As said by a learned
judge, 0 4 the execution of the power cannot be repeated. This
principle is clear and universally accepted, and proceeds upon
the very simple reason that the executor has, by the exercise of
the power, disposed of the title to a third person, and, as it has
thus passed out of his control, he can no more sell it again than
he can any other title which he does not own.
Since the power of sale is a common law power to be
strictly construed, and since the heir cannot be disinherited unless by some express provision in the will, and the devisees must
take unless something else in the will directs otherwise, a power
of sale can only be valid when it is (i) to pay debts; (2) to
satisfy charges provided in the will; (3) to provide for the distribution or division of the property; (4) to provide for a valid
gift of the proceeds of the sale;105 (5) to provide for investment
and re-investment of the trust property, upon which an equitable
estate is superimposed. This last case, that of power of sale in
the trustee, lies outside our discussion and will be briefly referred to at this point only in the interest of clearness. 10 6
A common form of a power in a trustee is where there is a
trust created for life with limitations over on the death of the
life tenant, and a power is vested in the executors or trustees to
' See Ex parte Elliott, s Wharf. 524 (184o). Power of sale exhausted
by sale of ground rent, no power left to extinguish the rent.
..Gibson, C. J., in Ex parte Elliott, 5 Whart. 52 (1840). In this case
there was a conveyance reserving a ground rent, and the court intimated
that the power was thereby exhausted, and the executors could not release
or extinguish.
1'0 (i)
A power to sell for the purpose of distributing the proceeds
amongst persons who are named or described in the will is a power which
belongs to the executor virtute offleii. (2) Where there is no limitation as to
the time of the exercise of the power of sale given to the executors in a will,
the same may be controlled within a certain period, ascertainable from the
general scheme and purpose of the will. (3) The duration of an executor's
power to sell real estate depends upon the intent of the testator, and where
the will shows that the testator gave this power for a particular purpose, the
power ceases to exist after that purpose has been accomplished or has become
impossible or unattainable. (4) Where power is given by will to executors
to sell real estate, with a view to the distribution of the proceeds among
legatees, such power belongs to the executors virtute officii. Livingston, P. J.,
in the court below, in Potts v. Breneman, 182 Pa. 295, at 300 (1897).
" For a few cases of a power to sell in a trustee, see Cresson v. Ferree,
7o Pa. 446 (1872) ; Marshall's Est., 138 Pa. 26o (i89o) ; Seeds v. Burk, I8I Pa.
281 (i897).
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sell and re-invest on the same trusts during the life tenancy. In
such case, the power falls at the death of the life tenant, the
time of the termination of the trust. 10 7 Where, however, the
executor has duties of distribution-to perform at the termination
of the life estate, the power is to be referred to the third class we
10 8

have mentioned.

Where the power of sale is to provide for the payment of
debts, we have already pointed out that the purchaser takes a
title free from the lien of the debts and is not liable to see to the
application of the purchase money. He is, therefore, not liable to
inquire as to the existence of the debts or the necessity of selling
the real estate for their payment 0 9
Nothing has been found in the books in Pennsylvania which
sheds any light on the question of how long after the death of
the testator a power of sale for the payment of debts may be
exercised. Whether the limitation of the lien of debts to two
years has any effect in the matter, has not been decided.
The case of a power to sell to provide for charges or legacies
created by the will is clear and not of frequent occurrence. The
power may be expressly conferred or may be implied from the
granting of the charge. In either case the exercise of the power
0
Wilkinson v. Buist, 124 Pa. 253 (1889), executor had sold two years
1°
after the death of the widow, who was life tenant, to A. A sold to B. B
agreed to sell to C, and in an action of assumpsit by B against C for the
contract price, it was held that he was not entitled to recover as his title was
void. Fidler v. Lash, x25 Pa. 87 (i889), the executor sold three months
after the death of the life tenant, and accounted for the proceeds in the
Orphans' Court. Sixteen years after the sale, the residuary devisees brought
ejectment against the parties claiming under the purchaser from the executor,
and recovered.
...
E. g., see Livingood v. Heffner, 21 W. N. C. 148 (1888).

...
Doran v. Piper, 164 Pa. 43o (1894). In this case the limitations were
as follows: "First, I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Charity, my
entire estate real and personal so long as she may remain my widow,
but should she marry again she shall be entitled then to what the law allows
widows commonly. I direct that my beloved wife pays all my just debts, and
raises my children in the love and fear of God, and after the death of their
mother my will is that my estate be equally divided amongst all my children,
and I further direct that should it be necessary on account of debts now or
debts that may accrue in maintaining the family, my wife will be privileged to
sell a portion of the real estate. And I direct that my wife, Charity, be my
sole executor in settling up my estate, etc., hereby revoking all former
wills by me made." The executor sold, and one of the children as residuary
devisee brought ejectment against the purchaser, and judgment for the defendant was affirmed, the court saying that it was not necessary for him to show
any necessity for the sale or the existence of debts. See also, Eisenbrown v.
Burns, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 46 (i9o6).
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is valid and confers a good title on the purchaser, .and he is not
liable, as we have seen, to see to the application of the purchase
money. In Adams's Estate, 110 there was a naked authority to
sell to pay debts and legacies, and the heir-at-law, of course, took
the title subject to the power, the exercise of which they sought
to restrain by offering to pay the legacies. The court held the
executors could sell nevertheless."'
Where the power is to sell for the purpose of distribution,
2
the power will not survive the time fixed for the distribution."
This period is usually the dropping of one or more lives, but as
the sale obviously cannot be made eo instanti on the death of the
life tenant, there must be a reasonable time after his decease for
the executors to make the sale. No case has been found deciding
what that period is.
Thus, where there is a gift of the proceeds of the sale and
a power to sell or direction to sell and pay over the proceeds to
the persons designated, the power will be exercisable so long as
there are any objects to which the proceeds can be applied, and
in most cases, if there is more than one object, they are clearly
3
separable and the failure of one will not affect the others."
Where the objects of the gift fail, as where they are contingent and the contingency upon which the gift was to take effect
has failed,1 4 or where the gift of the proceeds is. invalid under
the act relating to charitable gifts,"15 the power drops and
U0148

Pa. 394 (1892).

a criticism of this case, see Vol. 58, Univ. of Pa. Law Rev., p. 485.
Est., 24 Pa. C. C. 248 (19oo), obscurely reported, words of
will not given.
r"In Evans's App., 63 Pa. 183 (x869), there was a naked direction to sell,
with a gift of the proceeds, some of which failed. The executors undertook.
to sell to pay sorife legacies still remaining unpaid, and it was held that the
heirs had no standing to interfere with the discretion of the executors.
"In Smith v. Folwell, i Binney, 546 (i8o9), there was a direction to sell
and a gift of the proceeds of the sale to four brothers and sisters, or such
of them as should be living at the death of John. The court construed the
gift of the proceeds of the sale to the brothers and sisters to be contingent
on their being alive at the death of John, and as they were all dead at that
time, there was no reason for the exercise of the power, and it was held
that the sale which had been made by the executor was void.
'For

1Githens's

ul In Luffberry's App., 125 Pa. 513 (i889), there was a naked direction

to sell with a gift of the proceeds, which failed under the Act of I855 relating
to gifts to charities, and it was held that the title was in the heir-at-law and
the personal representatives had n6 standing to compel a sale. For a further
criticism of this case, see Univ. of Pa. Law Rev., Vol. 58, p. 485.
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can no longer be exercised with any effect, because the objects
for which it was to be exercised have ceased to exist. 116
The learned reader should recollect that in several of the
cases to which we have just referred, the question as to the
validity of the power arose in a proceeding by some of the parties interested in the estate either to restrain or compel the exercise of the power. It may be that a distinction can be drawn,
although no intimation to that effect has been found in the books,
between the case where the question arises before or at the time
of the exercise of the power, and in the case where the power
has been exercised, the deed delivered, and the purchaser has
paid his money. In this latter case, the court should not be
astute to put on the purchaser the burden of showing the neces7
sity of the exercise of the power."
In the case we have just discussed, the purpose of the sale
was expressed on the face of the power and the exercise of the
power was, as we have seen, valid so long as the reason for the
sale, as indicated, remained. There are, however, a number of
cases where there is a general power of sale conferred without
any purpose being disclosed, except so far as may be ascertained
from the other provisions of the will. Such a power of sale is,
however, conclusively presumed to be for the purpose of paying
debts, and may always be properly exercised by the executor
within the two*years subsequent to the death of the testator." s
After the expiration of the two years, however, or where
the debts are all paid, 1" 9 the power cannot be exercised unless
it can be referred to one or more of the particular purposes we
have heretofore pointed out.
In Swift's Appeal,

2 0°

a testatrix gave the residue of her

See Clark v. Campbell and Williamson, 2 Rawle, 215 (1828).
. See Doran v. Peiper, 164 Pa. 43o (1894) ; Eisenbrown v. Burns, 30 Pa.
Super. Ct. 46 (I9o5).

' A general power to sell will be conclusively presumed to be for the
payment of debts. See remarks of Sharswood, J., in Evans v. Chew, 71 Pa.
47 (1872), at 5I.
"DAnd a power of sale for the payment of debis is not properly exercised
when there are no debts. Robeno v. Marlatt, 136 Pa. 35 (18go); s. c. 26 W.
N. C. 385, reversing 6 Pa. C. C. 251, 46 L. I. 36; Wetherill v. Commonwealth,
17 W. N. C. 1O4 (I885), semble. See p. io6
1'87 Pa. 5o2 (1878).
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estate to her two sisters, after certain specific devises and general legacies, and authorized and empowered her executors to
sell all of her estate, real, personal and mixed wheresoever found.
After the payment of the debts and legacies there was a large
surplus of cash in the hands of the executors and considerable
real estate unsold. There was a petition by the residuary legatees
to compel the sale, which was dismissed, the executors having
sold all that was necessary to carry out the provisions of the will,
and the court said the power was exhausted. For a similar case,
see Espenship's Estate, 12 1 where the court held that the power
could not be exercised except so far as was necessary to pay th
debts and legacies, and its exercise was accordingly restrained
within the limits specified.
In Eberly v. Koller,122 there was a case stated between the
executor and the purchaser to determine the validity of the title
offered by the executor under the power. There was a general
power of sale conferred without any purposes disclosed except
the phrase "for the purpose of executing this will," which would
seem to be superfluous. No other provisions of the will were
set forth. It was held, in -an opinion by Biddle, P. J., in the
court below, affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court without
an opinion, that since no necessity for making the sale was shown,
the executors could not make title.
A common form of will is where the testator divides the
residue into several different shares creating a trust as to some
or all, and then inserts a general power of sale at the end of the
will. If the same persons, as is generally the case, are appointed
executors and trustees, the power may be of assistance in performing the duties as executor or may be of assistance in performing the duties as trustee under.the trust created, and such a
power will therefore probably survive so long as any of the
trusts remain.
Whenever, therefore, there is a general power of sale conferred without any purpose disclosed, and it appears from the
whole will that the egercise of the power is necessary either to
i13 Pa. C. C.
1=209

294

(1893).

Pa. 298 (1904).

622 POWERS OF S4LE IN AN EXECUTOR IN PENNSYLVANIA

pay debts, provide for charges in the will or as incident, to distribution of the property or as incident to a trust created in any
part of the will, the power may be exercised and a good title
conferred thereunder so long as any one of the reasons for the
objects specified remains, and since the testator may postpone
the distribution of his estate to any time in the future, so long as
he does not violate the rule against perpetuities, the power of
sale may be valid for a period of time extending over one or perhaps two generations, and the law is probably the same where
the executor and trustee are not the same person, although in
this case it would be safer for the purchaser to see that the purchase money is properly distributed under the limitations in the
will.
Roland R. Foulke.
Philadelphia, Pa.

